1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Peter T. Haven (SBN 175048) HAVEN LAW 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 300 Manhattan Beach, California 90266 Tel: (213) 842-4617 Fax: (213) 477-2137 Email: peter@havenlaw.com  Attorney for Defendant MICHAEL R. PAPAYANS	
8	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION	
10		
11	CORY SPENCER, an individual;	Case No. 2:16-cv-02129-SJO-RAO
12	DIANA MILENA REED, an individual; and COASTAL	NOTICE OF MOTION AND
13	PROTECTION RANGERS, INC., a California non-profit public benefit	MOTION BY DEFENDANT MICHAEL R. PAPAYANS FOR SUMMARY HIDOMENT OR IN THE
14	corporation; Plaintiffs,	SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS;
15	LUNADA BAY BOYS; THE	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
16	INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE LUNADA BAY BOYS, including but	[Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 56]
17	not limited to SANG LEE, BRANT BLAKEMAN, ALAN JOHNSTON aka	[Concurrently Filed: Decl. of Peter Haver
18	JALIAN JOHNSTON, MICHAEL RAE PAPAYANS, ANGELO	w/ Exhibits; Statement of Facts and Law]
19	CHARLIE FERRARA, and N.F.; CITY	Date: August 21, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m.
20	OF PALOS VERDES ESTATES; CHIEF OF POLICE JEFF KEPLEY, in	Place: Courtroom 10C 350 W. 1st Street
21 22	his representative capacity; and DOÉS 1 – 10,	Los Angeles, California 90012
23	Defendants.	Hon. S. James Otero
24	TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:	
25	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 21, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon	
26	thereafter as the matter may be heard by the Hon. S. James Otero, United States	
27	District Court Judge, in Courtroom 10C of the above-indicated United States	
28		
	DEFENDANT PAPAYANS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	

District Court, located at 350 W. 1<sup>st</sup> Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant MICHAEL R. PAPAYANS ("Papayans") will and hereby does move the Court for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication of claims.

This motion is made on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Papayans is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Cory Spencer, Diana Reed, and Coastal Protection Rangers, Inc. ("Plaintiffs") have never met or interacted with Papayans. Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidence to maintain their causes of action against Papayans for alleged: (1) interference with Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under California's Bane Act, (2) public nuisance, (3) assault, (4) battery, and (5) negligence. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)(1)(B) ("showing that the materials cited do not establish the ... presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317, 325 ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' – that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 ("the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element ... or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.").

If for any reason the Court does not entirely grant Papayans summary judgment, the Court is requested to grant Papayans partial summary judgment and/or summary adjudication as follows:

- 1. Plaintiffs do not have evidence sufficient to prove that Papayans committed a battery upon Plaintiffs;
- 2. Plaintiffs do not have evidence sufficient to prove that Papayans committed an assault upon Plaintiffs;

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### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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#### INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF MOTION I.

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#### II. **BRIEF FACTS**

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Plaintiffs Cory Spencer, Diana Milena Reed, and Coastal Protection Rangers, Inc., a California corporation ("Plaintiffs"), assert claims of alleged harassment and

"localism" at a State beach. In addition to claims against the City of Palos Verdes Estates and the City's Police for alleged failure to stop the claimed localism, the

Plaintiffs also bring causes of action against individual Defendants for alleged acts of localism. One of these individual Defendants is Michael Papayans ("Papayans").

The Plaintiffs, however, have never met Papayans or interacted with him, and they have no evidence sufficient to show that he is involved in a civil conspiracy, association, or gang. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Papayans is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

#### Plaintiffs Assert Tort Claims and Civil Conspiracy Allegations A.

Plaintiffs allege they lack complete access to Lunada Bay, a state beach in Palos Verdes Estates, due to alleged localism. "Localism is a territorial practice whereby resident surfers attempt to exclude nonresident beachgoers and surfers through threats, intimidation, and violence." Complaint, p. 7, ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege that Papayans and the other individual Defendants are engaged in a "Civil Conspiracy" to act as a gang or association known as the "Lunada Bay Boys": "Defendant LUNADA BAY BOYS is a criminal gang whose members are primarily engaged in criminal and nuisance activities which constitute Bane Act violations and a public nuisance." Complaint, Civil Conspiracy Allegations, p. 26, ¶ 52. Based on these Civil Conspiracy Allegations, the Plaintiffs allege that the Lunada Bay Boys are an unincorporated association under California Code of Civil

Procedure § 369.5 or Corporations Code § 18035(a), and/or a "criminal street 1 gang" under California *Penal Code* § 186.22(f). Complaint, ¶¶ 16, 17. 2 Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action against the individual 3 Defendants, including Papayans: (1st) Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1(b), 4 alleged interference or attempted interference with the Plaintiffs' exercise or 5 enjoyment of their federal and state constitutional rights; (2<sup>nd</sup>) public nuisance, 6 California Civil Code §§ 3479, 3480; (6th) assault, (7th) battery, (8th) negligence. 7 8 В. Plaintiffs Did Not Meet or Interact with Papayans 9 The Plaintiffs have "heard" of Papayans, but they have never met or 10 interacted with him. In their depositions, the Plaintiffs testified as follows: 11 Deposition of Plaintiff Corey Spencer 12 Q Do you know who Michael Papayans is? 13 A I know that's a name that's popped up a lot in Lunada Bay. 14 I know he's allegedly a Bay Boy, and I've heard it but ... 15 I'm sorry. Go ahead. Are you finished? Q 16 I'm finished. A **17** Q Thank you. 18 To your knowledge, have you ever seen Michael Papayans? 19 Not that I can recall. 20 Α To your knowledge, do you know if Michael Papayans had Q 21 any involvement in these Lunada Bay incidents that you've 22 described here today That you were personally involved with? 23 I don't know if he was there when I was there. I couldn't answer that. A 24 Declaration of Peter T. Haven ("Haven Decl."), ¶ 3, Exhibit 1, Deposition of 25 Plaintiff Cory Spencer ("Spencer Depo."), 323:7-16, 324:18-23. 26 27

#### Deposition of Plaintiff Diana Reed 1 Q Okay. Now, so you do – you are able to sort of put a face to the 2 name of Michael Papayans, it's your understanding of what he 3 looks like based on these videos; is that correct? A That's correct, yes. 5 Do you know if you have ever personally seen Michael Papayans Q 6 at Lunada Bay when you were there? 7 I don't remember personally seeing him myself. 8 A This is what you've heard, but you personally have never had any Q 9 encounter with him to your knowledge? 10 I personally haven't had anything like person to person with him. A 11 Haven Decl., ¶ 4, Exhibit 2, Deposition of Plaintiff Diana Reed ("Reed Depo."), 12 370:18 - 371:2, 372:1-5.13 The Plaintiffs' deposition testimony establishes that they have not seen, met 14 or interacted with Papayans, and they have not had any incidents with him. 15 Similarly, there is no evidence of any interaction between Papayans and 16 Plaintiff Coastal Protection Rangers, Inc., a California corporation. 17 18 C. Papayans Was Involved in One Argument with a Non-Party 19 Plaintiffs may rely on the fact that, in or about March 2014, Papayans got into 20 a shouting match with a non-party, Christopher Taloa, who had started a social 21 media campaign "game" against the local surfers to provoke them: "The game is to 22 draw them out like a salve." Exhibit 3, Deposition of Chris Taloa ("Taloa Depo."), 23 265:8-12; 284:22-25; 320:25 - 323:4. 24 After starting this campaign, Taloa and Papayans got into a heated shouting 25 argument one day at Lunada Bay. The argument was not physical, and Taloa did not 26 press any charges: 27 28

DEFENDANT PAPAYANS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

And you indicated to them [the Police] that you didn't want to press Q. 1 charges? 2 I didn't want to press charges. \* \* \* 3 A. And you said he [Papayans] didn't do anything to me? Q. He didn't get physical with me. 5 A. Okay. That's what you meant? He didn't get physical with you? Q. 6 A. He didn't get physical with me. 7 Exhibit 4, Taloa Depo., 345:1-3: 365:17-21. 8 This incident does not evidence anything, and it did not involve the Plaintiffs. 9 10 11 III. **ARGUMENT** A Defendant Is Entitled to Summary Judgment if the Plaintiff Lacks 12 Sufficient Evidence to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 13 Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), provides for a 14 motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment: "The court shall grant 15 summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 16 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 17 A moving party may show there is no genuine dispute of material fact by 18 "showing that the materials cited do not establish the ... presence of a genuine 19 dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the 20 fact." FRCP Rule 56(c)(1)(B). 21 "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' – that is, 22 pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the 23 nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317, 325. 24 "[T]he moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element ... 25 or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential 26 27

element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." *Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 1099, 1102.

"One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims ...." *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 324-325. "Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *Celotex* at 324.

Plaintiffs have not met or interacted with Papayans, and they have no evidence sufficient to show that Papayans was involved in an alleged conspiracy.

# B. Papayans Did Not Meet, Touch, Batter, or Assault the Plaintiffs

To prove an assault, the Plaintiffs must prove, among other things, that the "defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner[.]" To prove a battery, the Plaintiffs must prove, among other things, that the "defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff[.]" *Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin*, 212 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 652, 668–69 (2013) (citations omitted).

Papayans did not meet or interact with the Plaintiffs, much less touch them. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs cannot prove these claims.

## C. Papayans Did Not Breach any Duty Owed to Plaintiffs

"The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury." *McIntyre v. Colonies-Pac.*, *LLC*, 228 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 664, 671 (2014). Papayans did not meet or interact with the Plaintiffs, so he did not owe, nor did he breach, any duty of care. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs cannot prove this claim.

#### D. Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer any Acts of Nuisance by Papayans

To prove their public nuisance claim against Papayans, the Plaintiffs must show that Papayans substantially and unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs' exercise of common public rights. "[P]ublic nuisances ... are 'offenses against, or interferences with, the exercise of rights common to the public,' such as public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. To qualify as a public nuisance, the interference must be both substantial and objectively unreasonable." *Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego*, 8 Cal.App.5<sup>th</sup> 350, 358 (2017).

The Plaintiffs must also show that Papayans caused the Plaintiffs harm. "Causation is an essential element of a public nuisance claim. A plaintiff must establish a 'connecting element' or a 'causative link' between the defendant's conduct and the threatened harm. \* \* \* A plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct was a 'substantial factor' in causing the alleged harm. *Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego*, 8 Cal.App.5<sup>th</sup> 350, 359 (2017).

Papayans did not meet or interact with the Plaintiffs, so he did not subject them to any acts of public nuisance. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs cannot prove this claim.

# E. Papayans Did Not Interfere with Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights

California's Bane Act provides legal or equitable relief for an "individual whose exercise or enjoyment of [federal or state constitutional] rights ... has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with ...." California Civil Code \$52.1(b). Thus, Plaintiffs must prove that Papayans interfered with, or attempted to interfere with, the Plaintiffs' exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional rights.

Papayans did not meet or interact with the Plaintiffs, and he did not interfere with their constitutional rights. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs cannot prove this claim.

## F. Plaintiffs Have No Evidence that Papayans Is a Co-Conspirator

The Plaintiffs do not have evidence sufficient to prove that Papayans is an alleged co-conspirator, and therefore an alleged gang or association member:

Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden to prove it. They must show that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it. It is not enough that the [alleged conspirators] knew of an intended wrongful act, they had to agree – expressly or tacitly – to achieve it. Unless there is such a meeting of the minds, 'the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not amount to a conspiracy.'

Choate v. County of Orange, 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333 (2000) (citations omitted).

Papayans did not meet or interact with Plaintiffs, and they have no evidence sufficient to show that he is a co-conspirator, gang member, or association member. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs cannot prove their claims.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs have not met or interacted with Papayans, and they have no evidence sufficient to show that he is a co-conspirator, gang, or association member. There is no issue of material fact, and Papayans is entitled to judgment. Papayans also joins in the summary judgment motions of all other Defendants. *Vazquez v. Central States Joint Bd.*, 547 F.Supp.2d 833, 867. (N.D.III. 2008).

DATED: July 24, 2017 HAVEN LAW

By: /s/ Peter T. Haven
Peter T. Haven
Attorney for Defendant
MICHAEL R. PAPAYANS